The return of the BOM

Because sometimes you can't teach an old malware developer new tricks

There’s nothing new in Brazilian cybercriminals trying out new ways to stay under the radar. It’s just that this time around the bad guys have started using a method that was reported in the wild years ago.

Russian gangs used this technique to distribute malware capable of modifying the hosts file on Windows systems. Published by McAfee in 2013, the UTF-8 BOM (Byte Order Mark) additional bytes helped these malicious crews avoid detection.

Since these campaigns depended on spear phishing to increase the victim count, the challenge was to fool email scanners and use a seemingly corrupted file that lands in the victim’s inbox.

The first indicator appears when the user tries to open the ZIP file with the default file explorer and sees the following error:

The error message suggests the file is corrupt, but when we check its contents we see something strange in there.

Zip header prefixed by UTF-8 BOM

Instead of having the normal ZIP header starting with the “PK” signature (0x504B), we have three extra bytes (0xEFBBBF) that represent the Byte Order Mark (BOM) usually found within UTF-8 text files. Some tools will not recognize this file as being a ZIP archive format, but will instead recognize it as an UTF-8 text file and fail to extract the malicious payload.

However, utilities such as WinRAR and 7-Zip ignore this data and extract the content correctly. Once the user extracts the file with any of these utilities they can execute it and infect the system.

The file is successfully extracted by WinRAR

The malicious executable acts as a loader for the main payload which is embedded in the resource section.

Resource table showing the resource containing the encrypted data

Encrypted DLL stored in resource section

The content stored inside the resource, encrypted with a XOR-based algorithm, is commonly seen in different malware samples from Brazil. The decrypted resource is a DLL that will load and execute the exported function “BICDAT”.

Code used to load the extracted DLL and execute the exported function BICDAT

This library will then download a second stage payload which is a password-protected ZIP file and encrypted with the same function as the embedded payload. After extracting all the files, the loader will then launch the main executable.

Code executed by BICDAT function

Strings related to Banking RAT malware

The final payload that’s delivered is a variant of a Banking RAT malware, which is currently widespread in Brazil and Chile.

Kaspersky Lab products can extract and analyze compressed ZIP files containing the Byte Order Mark without any problem.

Indicators of compromise


The return of the BOM

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *



The leap of a Cycldek-related threat actor

The investigation described in this article started with one such file which caught our attention due to the various improvements it brought to this well-known infection vector.

Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle

In mid-2020, we realized that Lazarus was launching attacks on the defense industry using the ThreatNeedle cluster, an advanced malware cluster of Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped). While investigating this activity, we were able to observe the complete life cycle of an attack, uncovering more technical details and links to the group’s other campaigns.

Sunburst backdoor – code overlaps with Kazuar

While looking at the Sunburst backdoor, we discovered several features that overlap with a previously identified backdoor known as Kazuar. Our observations shows that Kazuar was used together with Turla tools during multiple breaches in past years.

Subscribe to our weekly e-mails

The hottest research right in your inbox