Incidents

Shady Ops

The ShadyRAT whitepaper spectacle coincided with the start of the Blackhat USA 2011 conference. While it was noted that AV vendors reliably detect related ShadyRAT downloader components, discussion of other components were absent. The downloaders vaguely mentioned in the report have been reliably detected by Kaspersky Lab products for years.

More information was provided later on another vendor’s site. But whitepaper readers were left with only a dive into the high level data compiled by the attackers’ web monitoring components and no actionable information presented.

Meanwhile, over on the HBGary blog, the more interesting descriptions of the meat of the backdoor components and communications were discussed – something sysadmins can do something about.

We also added detection of this component and variants like it as Backdoor.Win32.Shady.a (Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.szfj), which was actually used early 2011 and after several months, still active and detected only by Sophos.

This prolonged absence of detection is both acutely problematic and symptomatic of active, determined groups. These Shady backdoors are especially interesting for their style of covert communications with hidden messages appearing in HTML source text on both compromised and managed sites.

Shady Ops

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

 

Reports

APT trends report Q3 2022

This is our latest summary of advanced persistent threat (APT) activities, focusing on events that we observed during Q3 2022.

APT10: Tracking down LODEINFO 2022, part I

The first part of this report will provide technical analysis of the new infection methods such as SFX files and DOWNIISSA, a new downloader shellcode used to deploy the LODEINFO backdoor.

Subscribe to our weekly e-mails

The hottest research right in your inbox