Exploit kit creators have been inventing increasingly interesting methods of masking their exploits, shellcodes, and payloads so that it is harder for analysts to define the type of the exploit and know what actions they may perform. Several days ago analysts found the usage of the DiffieHellman cryptographic protocol in the Angler Exploit Kit, which is one of the most popular exploit kits at the moment.
In Angler, threat actors used the DiffieHellman protocol to get a structure with the shellcode of one of the recent exploits for the CVE20152419 vulnerability for the Internet Explorer 11 browser and then for the CVE20155560 vulnerability exploit for Adobe Flash. Most likely, the goal of the threat actors was creating difficulties in firewall detection of the exploit (as firewalls cannot decipher a shellcode and exploit by the means of the intercepted traffic analysis) and also making it harder for the analysts to get the exploit code. However, the experts from Kaspersky Lab managed to perform a successful attack against DiffieHellman protocol implementation and decipher the shellcode.
Angler vs. Analysts
To make matters worse for analysts, JavaScript code and ActionScript code multiple obfuscation and a user IP ban upon sending the encrypted structure with a shellcode to the user were used in addition to the DiffieHellman protocol. After getting the structure with the shellcode by that means (encrypted with a onetime key by using the DiffieHellman protocol), the exploit kit sample becomes unusable after one processing: the analyst is unable to understand what a specific file does, reproduce the attack, and, quite often, identify the exploit and vulnerability at all.
A key exchange and getting a shellcode for the CVE20152419 exploit
There is a key exchange request in the picture above. As a response, a browser gets from the threat actors’ server an encrypted array that contains a shellcode to exploit the vulnerability. The same traffic request has been used to download the Flash vulnerability exploit.
As the secret for key generation is new each time, an analyst is unable to send it to the browser once more, reproduce the attack, and identify the vulnerability, even if he has the recorded traffic.
DiffieHellman Protocol Implementation Features
The used implementation of the DiffieHellman protocol includes the following:

The server generates a random number g (16 bytes) and sends the HTML page with the number g and JavaScript implementation of the DiffieHellman algorithm to the user’s browser.

JavaScript generates a random modulo p (16 bytes) and a random private key Ka (16 bytes) in the user’s browser, and then JavaScript calculates the public key A = g^{Ka} mod p and sends the three numbers (g, A, p) to the server as a JSON object along with the Internet browser version.
{"g":"40a262b1360a6a16612ca8251161a9a5","A":"5eff90f1c48342f5d519cd02b5dfd8b","p":"1b0b5c6e6b0b5b7e6c6d0b1b0a8c3c7e","v":"17923"}

The server generates its own random private key Kb and its random encryption key Kx (16 bytes) and finds the DiffieHellman shared secret Kdh = A^{Kb} mod p. After that, the server encrypts the shellcode by using the XTEA algorithm and the key Kx, then base64_encode and urlencode, getting the string b as a result. Then, the key Kx is also encrypted by XTEA with the key Kdh, base64_encode, and urlencode, getting the string k as a result. And finally, the server calculates its public key B = g^{Kb} mod p and sends Base64encrypted JSON object that contains B, k, and b to the browser:
eyJCIjoiMDJhYTY1MjZlNmVkYzAwNDIzOTRiN2VhODFlYzViNzUiLCJrIj…1k1dnVNYWY1UlVXZjYxSSUzRCJ9
After Base64 decoding:
{"B":"02aa6526e6edc0042394b7ea81ec5b75","k":"I5nkiFBk3LALF%2BnfkR7%2FYQ%3D%3D","b":"to0ShZH…3Y5vuMaf5RUWf61I%3D"}

A user’s browser calculates the DiffieHellman shared secret Kdh = B^{Ka} mod p, decrypts k urldecode, base64_decode, and XTEA by using the key Kdh, getting the key Kx, and eventually decrypts the urldecode, base64_decode, and XTEA shellcode by using the key Kx.
It is safe to assume that the aim of using the given sophisticated cryptographic system is shellcode interception prevention by listening to the Internet traffic between the server with the exploit kit and the user’s browser. We managed to perform a successful attack against the implementation of the encryption protocol and decrypt the shellcode. We used the modified PohligHellman algorithm for the attack (a deterministic algorithm of discrete logarithmfinding in the residue ring modulo a prime number).
According to the original algorithm, for the case when the Euler function expansion of the modulo p into prime factors q_{i} is known (coprime factors Q_{i})
the complexity of finding the private key Ka and the DiffieHellman shared secret Kdh by using intercepted public keys A and B is
We used an optimized algorithm of finding the discrete logarithm in the residue ring modulo a prime number, taking into account the infinitesimality of logp with respect to q_{i}, and low probability of occurrence of large prime factors raised to the power of greater than one in the Euler function φ(p); i.e., α_{i} will equal one for large q_{i} with a high probability. Owing to that, the complexity of the modified algorithm is
which allows us to perform a successful attack in case if all q_{i} < 10^{18}. The experiment has shown that the given condition is observed in more than a half of cases of using the aforementioned DiffieHellman protocol implementation (the case of randomly generated g, p, Ka, and Kb without their extra security checks).
Description of the Modified PohligHellman Algorithm

Let us find the expansion of the number p into prime factors (the factorization can be easily done with Cryptool):
p = 0x1b0b5c6e6b0b5b7e6c6d0b1b0a8c3c7e = 35948145881546650497425055363061529726 = 2 * 101 * 521 * 195197 * 7138079603 * 245150552958961933

Let us find the Euler function for the number p:
φ(p) = (21) * (1011) * (5211) * (1951971) * (71380796031) * (2451505529589619331) = 17761863220777184249809368812124288000

Let us find the expansion of the Euler function into prime factors:
φ(p) = 2^10 * 3^2 * 5^3 * 13 * 19 * 79 * 167 * 383 * 48799 * 45177719 * 5603527793

In order to find the browser’s private key Ka, it is necessary to find a discrete logarithm:
A = gKa mod p
A = 0x5eff90f1c48342f5d519cd02b5dfd8b = 7892150445281019518426774740123123083
g = 0x40a262b1360a6a16612ca8251161a9a5 = 14017453774474660607531272629759062185 (mod p)As immediately finding Ka modulo φ(p) is quite timeconsuming, let us find Ka by turns for each of the coprime factors Q_{i} of the Euler function φ(p)
[1024, 9, 125, 13, 19, 79, 167, 383, 48799, 45177719, 5603527793],
and, by using the obtained results and the Chinese remainder theorem, let us immediately find Ka modulo φ(p).

In order to find Ka modulo Q_{i}, it is necessary to find a discrete logarithm
To do that, we shall
5.1. take the number H=⌊√(Q_{i})⌋+1;
5.2. calculate D_{c}=D_{a}^{H} mod p;
5.3. make a sorted table of values D_{c}^{u} mod p for 1 ≤ u ≤ H;
5.4. find such a value of 0 ≤ v ≤H, that the element D_{b} ∙ D_{a}^{v} mod p is in the table;
5.5. The value of Ka modulo Q_{i} equals Huv.The implementation of the described algorithm in Java is given in the Appendix A. As in the reviewed example the maximum value of Q_{i} is only several billions, the program execution time did not exceed several seconds.
For some of the Q_{i} factors of the Euler function φ(p), there are several possible Ka values (there are possible Ka modulo Q_{i} values in the row number i):
1234567891011[834, 898, 962, 2, 842, 906, 970, 10, 850, 914, 978, 18, 858, 922, 986, 26, 866, 930, 994, 34, 874, 938, 1002, 42, 882, 946, 1010, 50, 890, 954, 1018, 58, 826][4][18, 68, 118, 43, 93][9][12][42][6][21][11929][24277014][2536644002] 
By going over all of the possible combinations of obtained Ka values by using the Chinese remainder theorem, we find several tens of possible Ka modulo φ(p) values:
0x8ae47b27ebdbcbe1b78c4a67de5b78a
0x5ef6ad7b83c6e7e0442ac5f5dc7f9a
0x1ed2c9a202ac327647ba12cf06ac3a
…
0x1dfce04948a67285c2ecef8dedf73da
0x3509c62b730c0bb7d9a56fefe2cf342
0xb5518dde7541768bd286d63d8e75f42
0x60776871627621379c91be922e40fd2
0x9e44a7fc4adbdd59bbce55db999dfda
0x98ec54ff8019a390e6c4f1985d21b5a 
All of the obtained values of the private key Ka lead to the same value of the DiffieHellman shared secret Kdh = B^{Ka} mod p:
0x0eb034f99e33e17df058de5b448b7241

By knowing Kdh, it is possible to decrypt the encryption key Kx from k and the shellcode by using Kx. The PHP script for decrypting the intercepted shellcode by using the known DiffieHellman shared secret is given in the Appendix B. The decrypted shellcode is given in the Appendix C.
Testing of the DiffieHellman Protocol Implementation Attack in the Angler Exploit Kit
To test the effectiveness and functionality of the attack, several tests were conducted.

A test with a traffic dump from malware.dontneedcoffee.com with the exploit for CVE20152419.
{"g":"538c40fc6ec04c7a5e0790564b2afe33","A":"25d9508418493284da024712a41a29a1","p":"6e2e5c0b4c4d8d3c7a5d1e3d8a5d7c3e","v":"17728"}
{"B":"481dbc66fe90ded2eb8d027395abe4fd", …
p = 146455792068641286704746413745292278846 = 2 * 2269 * 1057223 * 1292823547 * 23612186462182360807
φ(p) = 73195553541542938096767116236244889696 = 2^5 * 3^6 * 7^3 * 17 * 617 * 7127 * 528611 * 231492024139042753
Owing to a significantly large factor φ(p) (about 10^{18}), finding the DiffieHellman shared secret took several hours:
0x568f7a306bf07e999ba881befc615c73
The decrypted shellcode is given in the Appendix D.

A test with a traffic dump from malware.dontneedcoffee.com with the exploit for CVE20152419 and CVE20155560.
The new version of the Angler Exploit Kit has minor changes in the servertoscript communication protocol:
{"6860":"false","47da":"47dadcbd7c8351a26860da263ca8e0af","dcbd":"5d1b0d5d5c4a8c5d1d5b4d6a3b5d7e3b","7c83":"5757a0b79bb137a77f87d554d1559274","51a2":"17937"}
{"47da":"3db7b45576c08f61feb454ece94762d3","dcbd":"4yIse5uSjsJXBZrbBMrpcA%3D%3D","7c83":"6r28v2n7…UPlLTbsCIxhg%3D"}7
As compared with the previous version, indices “g”, “A”, “p”, “B”, “b”, and “k” were replaced by the parts of the number g, and the order of the numbers sent to the server was changed (now, it is g, p, A not g, A, p as it was before). Besides that, the XTEA algorithm had two constant values and used when decrypting the shellcode bit operation modified:
Before (the original XTEA implementation) After for(var h=g[0],k=g[1],l=84941944608;0!=l;)
k=(h<<4^h>>>5)+h^l+d[l>>>11&3],
l=2654435769,
h=(k<<4^k>>>5)+k^l+d[l&3];for(var h=g[0],k=g[1],l=433284421593;0!=l;)
k=(h<<4^h>>5)+h^l+d[l>>11&3],
l=3411688359,
h=(k<<4^k>>5)+k^l+d[l&3];For the given traffic, we managed to factorize the Euler function φ(p)
p = 123758666691284322087508686576379854395 = 5 * 11 * 47 * 73 * 83 * 173 * 1055371 * 43277569507162384847671
φ(p) = 85339058418474058501009217357034700800 = 2^14 * 3^6 * 5^2 * 23 * 41 * 43 * 127 * 277 * 1949 * 102798053917762603
find the DiffieHellman shared secret
0x04db8bd5b7abc90fa8409989af532531
and decrypt the shellcode for CVE20152419 (given in the Appendix E).
In addition to that, threat actors started to use the DiffieHellman key exchange pattern also for Flash exploits in the new version of the Angler Exploit Kit (i.e., the creators of the exploit kit programmed the same algorithms in PHP, JavaScript, and ActionScript). The protocol exploit and shellcode download format for the Flash vulnerability is the same as the one for the shellcode vulnerability for Internet Explorer:
{"4256":"425667992b18942d377eff0218961ce7","6799":"3d0d6c3b4a5b5e2c2d5d6d6e1a5a2e1a","942d":"18,0,0,209","377e":"false","2b18":"0339b845ae35e9d7af629fa2d0d0fed3"} {"4256":"014b170e00b46fd3fc35ce8766293c69","6799":"YZfySNTEMcSWl8QqrgSuGA%3D%3D","2b18":"ZEQNbP…zH5Uk%3D"}Modulo p and the Euler function φ(p) factors:
p = 81152602799751951422044316006212054554 = 2 * 3 * 36329424479 * 10983441260369 * 33896452871009
φ(p) = 27050867599169456821145398677392574464 = 2^11 * 7 * 13 * 199 * 91279961 * 11640265409 * 686465078773
the DiffieHellman shared secret:
0x16f6f645b5993dde0be2f5c1e2c367f1
The decrypted exploit and shellcode for CVE20155560 is given in the Appendix F.
Appendix A. The DiffieHellman Protocol Attack Implementation in Java
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899import java.math.BigInteger;import java.util.HashSet;import java.util.Iterator;import java.util.Set;import java.util.TreeMap;import java.util.Vector;public class Test1 {static BigInteger p = new BigInteger("1b0b5c6e6b0b5b7e6c6d0b1b0a8c3c7e", 16);static BigInteger psi = new BigInteger("17761863220777184249809368812124288000");static BigInteger g = new BigInteger("40a262b1360a6a16612ca8251161a9a5", 16).mod(p);static BigInteger A = new BigInteger("5eff90f1c48342f5d519cd02b5dfd8b", 16);static BigInteger B = new BigInteger("02aa6526e6edc0042394b7ea81ec5b75", 16);static long[] q = new long[]{1024L, 9L, 125L, 13L, 19L, 79L, 167L, 383L, 48799L, 45177719L, 5603527793L};static int q_len = q.length;static HashSet[] xi = new HashSet[q_len];static BigInteger ai[] = new BigInteger[q_len];static HashSet res = new HashSet();static void rec(int ind){if (ind == q_len){BigInteger x = BigInteger.ZERO;for(int i=0;i<q_len;i++){BigInteger mn = new BigInteger(((Long)q[i]).toString());BigInteger M = psi.divide(mn);x = x.add(ai[i].multiply(M).multiply(M.modInverse(mn)));}res.add(B.modPow(x.mod(psi), p));//res.add(x.mod(psi));return;}Iterator<Long> it = xi[ind].iterator();while(it.hasNext()){ai[ind] = new BigInteger(it.next().toString());rec(ind + 1);}}public static void main(String[] args) {for(int i=0;i<q_len;i++){xi[i] = new HashSet<Long>();long qi = q[i];int H = (int)Math.sqrt((double)qi) + 1;BigInteger _a = g.modPow(psi.divide(new BigInteger(((Long)qi).toString())), p);BigInteger _b = A.modPow(psi.divide(new BigInteger(((Long)qi).toString())), p);BigInteger _c = _a.modPow(new BigInteger(((Integer)H).toString()), p);BigInteger _cp = _c;int u_size = 1000000;boolean stop = false;for(int u_part = 1;u_part<=H && !stop;u_part+=u_size){if (H > u_size){System.out.print("[i] Processing ");System.out.println(u_part);}TreeMap<BigInteger, Integer> table = new TreeMap<>();for(int u=u_part;u<=H && u<u_part + u_size;u++){table.put(_cp, u);_cp = _cp.multiply(_c).mod(p);}BigInteger z = _b;for(int v=0;v<=H;v++){if (table.get(z) != null){xi[i].add((((long)H)*table.get(z)  v) % qi);stop = true;break;}z = z.multiply(_a).mod(p);}table.clear();System.gc();}System.out.println(xi[i].toString());}rec(0);Iterator<BigInteger> it = res.iterator();while(it.hasNext()){System.out.println(it.next().toString(16));}}}Appendix B. Intercepted Encrypted Shellcode Decryption PHP Script by Using the Known DiffieHellman Shared Secret
123456789101112131415161718192021<?phpinclude 'xtea_ak.php';$dh = "0eb034f99e33e17df058de5b448b7241";$resp = "eyJCIjoiMDJhYTY1MjZ…";$dh = hex2bin($dh);$json = json_decode(base64_decode(rawurldecode($resp)));$k = base64_decode(rawurldecode($json>k));$xtea = new XTEA($dh);$k = $xtea>Decrypt($k);$data = base64_decode(rawurldecode($json>b));$xtea = new XTEA($k);$data = $xtea>Decrypt($data);$data = rtrim($data, "");echo $data;?>Appendix C. Decrypted Shellcode
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dev
Please provide us MD5 of above sample
merge
Hello,
please publish md5 sample
Calle Svensson
Nice article, I have a few questions.
1. Usually when calculating the group order we use the Euler totient function, phi, defined as here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euler%27s_totient_function. You are linking to what looks like a more general Euler function. Is there a reason for this?
2. According to Wikipedia, the Pohlig–Hellman worst case complexity when the factorization is known is O(sum_i a_i(log(n)+sqrt(q_i))) but you have skipped the sqrt (which is technically still true but a looser bound. How come?
3. How do you go from simplifying the first complexity to the second? Is it possible that you missed the sqrt in the first and then accidentally put Q_i=q_i^a_i instead of just q_i in the second or am I missing something?