APT (Targeted attacks)

Once the driver is loaded, it decrypts a small block that contains its registry key and the name of the registry value to be read from that key. It also contains the name of the driver object to create

Comparing the data we uncovered with that obtained by other researchers and antivirus companies, we’ve elicited various common traits that have revealed the approximate timeline and overall methods used by Duqu’s authors.

First things first, I have to point out a mistake in the previous text. When analyzing the fourth incident in Iran, we stated that there were two network attacks on a victim machine from the IP address 63.87.255.149. It could have been an exclusive version of Duqu, but it turned out to be a big mistake.

Our investigation and research of Duqu malware continues.

First of all, we feel it necessary to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the files and their names related to this incident. To get a full understanding of the situation you only need to know that we’re talking about just two malicious programs here (at a minimum) – the main module and a keylogger.

This work-in-progress investigation tracks the Duqu Trojan and offers some answers to commonly asked questions.

While it was noted that AV vendors reliably detect related ShadyRAT downloader components, discussion of other components were absent.

The US Senate and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are just the latest in a growing line of high profile companies that have been subjected to a targeted cyberattack

There Is No Blogpost. There are only two pictures here.

The year 2010 has been almost identical to the previous one in terms of malware evolution. Generally speaking, trends have not changed that much and nor have the targets for attack; though certain malicious activities have progressed dramatically.

Over the last few days, Stuxnet has been covered extensively in the mass media. And it’s been covered differently by different sources. “Iran”, “Bushehr nuclear plant” and “cyber-weapon” are phrases which are already inexorably linked to Stuxnet.

Over the past few weeks the AV industry has continued to focus its research efforts on the Stuxnet worm. We blogged about what we found while we were investigating the malware; our Stuxnet series may have come to an end, but that doesn’t mean we’ve stopped our research.

So far in our series about Stuxnet we’ve focussed on the main issue: the threat posed by the zero-day vulnerability in the processing of LNK files, and the fact that cybercriminals have somehow got their hands on digital certificates. What we haven’t done in any detail is look at the worm’s functionality.

A few days ago we wrote about a new variant of the Stuxnet worm’s rootkit component, signed not with Realtek’s digital signature, but with one owned by JMicron. Costin posted about it in detail.

FAQ about the stolen JMicron and Realtek certificates.