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Spring Dragon – Updated Activity

In the beginning of 2017, Kaspersky Lab became aware of new activities by an APT actor we have been tracking for several years called Spring Dragon (also known as LotusBlossom). Information about the new attacks arrived from a research partner in Taiwan and we decided to review the actor’s tools, techniques and activities. Read Full Article

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From BlackEnergy to ExPetr

To date, nobody has been able to find any significant code sharing between ExPetr/Petya and older malware. Given our love for unsolved mysteries, we jumped right on it. We’d like to think of this ongoing research as an opportunity for an open invitation to the larger security community to help nail down (or disprove) the link between BlackEnergy and ExPetr/Petya. Read Full Article

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APT Trends report, Q1 2017

Kaspersky Lab is currently tracking more than a hundred threat actors and sophisticated malicious operations in over 80 countries. During the first quarter of 2017, there were 33 private reports released to subscribers of our Intelligence Services, with IOC data and YARA rules to assist in forensics and malware-hunting. Read Full Article

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Lazarus Under The Hood

Today we’d like to share some of our findings, and add something new to what’s currently common knowledge about Lazarus Group activities, and their connection to the much talked about February 2016 incident, when an unknown attacker attempted to steal up to $851M USD from Bangladesh Central Bank. Read Full Article

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Penquin’s Moonlit Maze

Moonlight Maze is the stuff of cyberespionage legend. In 1996 someone was rummaging through military, research, and university networks primarily in the United States, stealing sensitive information on a massive scale. To say that this historic threat actor is directly related to the modern day Turla would elevate an already formidable modern day attacker to another league altogether. Read Full Article

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Fileless attacks against enterprise networks

This threat was originally discovered by a bank’s security team, after detecting Meterpreter code inside the physical memory of a domain controller (DC). Kaspersky Lab participated in the forensic analysis, discovering the use of PowerShell scripts within the Windows registry. Additionally it was discovered that the NETSH utility as used for tunnelling traffic from the victim’s host to the attacker´s C2. Read Full Article